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Directors' Monitoring Role, Ownership Concentration and Audit 
fees  
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The UK corporate governance code is highly recommended rather than being enforced on 
companies, to achieve a better and more transparent relationship between shareholders and 
management. The code summarises different principles such as leadership, effectiveness, 
accountability, remuneration and principles governing relations with shareholders. The Board of 
Directors, considered one of the governance mechanisms, is responsible for assigning external 
auditors, approving audit fees, re-assigning external auditors, engaging with external auditors for 
non-audit assignments and establishing audit committees to co-operate with external auditors 
(FRC, 2012). In addition to the guidelines mentioned in the UK code, the Financial Service 
Authority aims for a better level of transparency by indicating that block holders should be 
disclosed separately in the financial statements.  
The role of external auditors has always been an issue of debate regarding the nature, 
responsibility and scope of tasks performed by auditors. The increase in monitoring costs, the 
change in the legal and the regulatory regime, that are expected to protect shareholders, are not 
leading to an increase in audit quality (Houghton et al., 2013). Poor reporting quality is due to the 
poor involvement of the Big Four firms in some markets (Habib and Jiang, 2015) which will lower 
audit fees. 
The existence of agency conflict in the Management-Board of Directors' relationship 
affects the external middle layer of governance, the external auditor. Public confidence for paying 
more audit fees to achieve better audit quality might be increased if banning non-audit services for 
auditors (Francis, 2004).   
The study contributes to the literature by providing extensive understanding of the 
influence of the board of directors, audit committees' formation and effectiveness, and ownership 
structure on audit fees. Audit fees are used as a proxy of audit quality (Kwon et al., 2014). Some 
studies in the field of audit fees did not differentiate between financial and non-financial 
institutions and ignored the audit committee characteristics factor (Carcello et al., 2002), others 
conducted their research on US and UK financial intuitions only (Jizi and Nehme, 2018; Nehme 
and Jizi. 2018). In this paper, we examine the determinants of the recurring yearly audit fees rather 
than total auditors' remuneration that may include audit and non-audit fees which have a negative 
impact on audit fees (Abdul et al., 2020 and Shao, 2006), as a specific and measurable agency cost 
(Leventis et al., 2011). The sample is made up of companies listed at the FTSE 350 excluding 
financial institutions to retain homogenous sample. Our findings may help top executives and 
decision makers to focus and utilize governance mechanisms that may lead to a decrease in audit 
fees and to resolve the mechanisms that are causing audit fees to increase. Alternatively, to focus 
on some governance mechanisms that lead to an increase in audit quality because of more effort 
by external auditors (Lin et al., 2018). The remainder of the paper is as follows: literature and 
hypotheses development are covered in section two, the sample selection and tested models are 
included in the research design in section three, section four elaborates the results and section five 
concludes. 
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2 PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Board Characteristics 
 
Role Duality. Previous literature provides mixed signals concerning the merits and hitches 
of CEO/chair dual roles. While Jizi and Nehme (2018) conclude a positive relationship between 
audit fees and role duality, others indicate a switch to lower auditor quality when the CEO is 
operating as a chairperson of the BO. Weak corporate governance companies tend to engage with 
lower auditor quality characterised by lower audit fees (Lin and Liu, 2009). An unhealthy corporate 
performance, in the presence of role duality, might push board members to demand more audit 
quality and subsequently to incur higher audit fees (Judge et al., 2003). The demand for better 
audit quality and the willingness to pay higher audit fees declines in the presence of role duality 
(Niskanen et al., 2011). CEO duality plays a major role in minimising information costs and 
enriching command leadership (Brickley et al., 1997). Minimising agency/information costs is 
associated with better information asymmetry and less work demanded from auditors. Knowing 
that external audit reports are used as a tool for assessing management stewardship, a CEO with 
dual position have a tendency to limit outside supervision (Desender et al., 2011). Accordingly, 
lower quality auditor with lower audit fees are in place. The hypothesis to be empirically tested 
would be as follows: 
H1a. There is a negative relationship between role duality and audit fees. 
 
Board Size. Large number of directors provide better monitoring over the process of 
financial reporting (Anderson et al., 2004). Boards with relatively larger size are more likely to 
benefit from diversified expertise and less workload (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Accordingly, the 
efficiency factor is crucial in big corporate boards in allocating control activities to achieve 
effective monitoring (John and Senbet, 1998). Smaller boards are likely to be more effective in 
coordination and communication (Dey, 2008) that may lead to less work demanded from external 
auditors and accordingly lower audit fees. Boards of directors vary in their technical and 
educational backgrounds. Boards with relatively large size benefit from diversification in directors' 
experience and they are not be exposed to management dominance (Monks and Minow, 1995). 
Carcello et al. (2002) argue that larger boards with diligent members require more audit quality 
from external auditors compared with companies with less diligent board members.   
Large board of directors demand more monitoring from auditors, which is associated with an 
increase in chargeable hours and audit fees (Karim et al., 2016). The hypothesis to be empirically 
tested is as follows: 
H1b. There is a positive relationship between boards of directors' size and audit fees. 
 
Board Independence. Independent directors strengthen the effectiveness of the monitoring 
process through external auditors (Jizi and Nehme, 2018; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 
1988). In-line with agency theory, independent directors demand higher quality audit for the 
benefit of protecting stockholders' wealth and reputation. Pervious literature highlights the 
tendency of independent directors toward hiring quality auditors (Abbott and Parker, 2000) to 
achieve better reporting quality (Uang et al., 2006). Similar to Carcello et al. (2002) and Zaman et 
al. (2011), the percentage of independent directors on the boards have a major influence on audit 
fees.  
Chen and Zhou (2007) argue that independent Board of Directors demands a better auditor 
reputation. Carcello et al. (2002) state that greater preponderance of independent members will 
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lead to more concern about audit quality in comparison to executive directors. This will raise the 
intention to 'purchase' higher quality audit service to ensure reliable audited financial information, 
thus leading to an increase in the audit fees. The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as 
follows: 
H1c. There is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent board members and 
audit fees. 
 
 
2.2  Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
Audit Committee Size. The larger the audit committee size the more authority it possesses 
(Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993) with a wider knowledge (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). In contrast, 
smaller audit committees depend on external auditors. It is implied that the characteristics of audit 
committees can be substituted by means of a corporate governance mechanism. Having a larger 
audit committee is shown to prevent the payment of inflated audit fees (Lin, 2018). Better quality 
of financial reporting and auditing is maintained and governance mechanisms are enhanced 
through proper construction and size of audit committees (Cohen et al., 2004). Audit committee 
members protect their reputational capital by demanding better external audit quality (Mat Zain et 
al., 2015). Zaman et al. (2011) emphasize the positive relationship between the size of the audit 
committee and internal control quality: larger committees have enhanced resource and 
effectiveness leading to greater amounts spent on reviewing the scope and the quality of auditors' 
output. Large audit committees with diverse backgrounds are engineered to increase the demand 
for better quality auditors (DeFond and Zhang, 2014) associated with higher audit fees. The 
hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H2a. There is a positive significant relationship between audit committee size and audit fees. 
 
Audit Committee Independence. Audit committee size and audit committee independence 
are said to be correlated. Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2017) indicate a negative relationship between 
audit fees and the independence of audit committees. It is found that audit committee independence 
is negatively related to dismissing external auditors after issuing a going-concern or unfavourable 
audit opinion (Carcello and Neal, 2003). Carcello and Neal (2000) reveal that companies have 
lower chances to receive going-concern reports when their audit committees have more affiliated 
directors. Audit committee independence played a significant role in the dismissal of Anderson 
before the scandal (Chen and Zhou, 2007). From a theoretical perspective, audit committees with 
independent directors are perceived to be an objective monitoring tool between principles and 
agents (Collier and Gregory, 2000).  
The audit committee, supported by the existence of independent directors, will lead to 
strengthening internal controls, resulting in less substantive assessment and testing required by 
external auditors, leading to lower audit fees (Collier and Gregory, 1996).  Therefore, the 
hypothesis to be empirically tested is as follows: 
H2b. There is a negative relationship between audit committees' independence and audit fees. 
Audit Committee Effectiveness. There are mixed findings in relation to the impact of audit 
committee meetings on audit fees. While Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle (2016) results indicate a 
non-significant impact of audit fees by audit committee meetings, Chen and Zhou (2007) argue 
that the frequency of audit committee meetings is associated with audit committee effectiveness. 
It has been found that after Andersen, the number of audit committee meetings is significantly and 
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positively related to the choice of a big four audit firm to be assigned, more active audit committees 
demanding better auditor reputation. Abbott and Parker (2000) find a significant positive 
relationship between effectiveness of audit committees and choosing a specialised and high quality 
auditor. Audit committee independence and audit fees have a negative relationship indicating that 
independent audit committee directors have more tendency to shield their reputational capital and 
avoid legal consequences paying higher audit fees to better quality auditors (Sellami and Cherif, 
2020). Active audit committees are expected to lower audit fees. Being active, audit committees 
require more time from external auditors leading to an increase in audit fees (Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2009). The hypothesis to be empirically tested would be as follows: 
H2c. There is a positive relationship between audit committees' frequency of meetings and audit 
fees. 
 
Audit Committee Expertise. The competency of audit committees is recognised more when 
financial and accounting experts exist (Cohen et al., 2002). Financial expertise of audit committee 
directors has a significant impact on the reporting quality and process (Tanyi and Smith, 2015). 
Prior literature has no consistent evidence regarding the impact of audit committees' expertise on 
audit fees. Zaman et al. (2011) indicate that there is no impact of the expertise factor on audit fees. 
But Carcello et al., (2002) and Abbott et al. (2003) indicate that the presence of financial expertise 
among audit committee members is shown to have positive impact on audit fees. Financially expert 
audit committee members possess better-enhanced monitoring skills and demand more audit work 
from external auditors. Ghafran and O'Sullivan (2017) state that a positive relationship exists 
between audit committee financial and accounting expertise and audit quality associated by audit 
fees.  Based on agency theory, regarding the monitoring role of principals, the presence of financial 
experts within audit committees is said to positively affect audit quality. This is due to financial 
expertsꞌ monitoring role and their intent to comply effectively with the principal-agent conceptual 
framework (Goodwin-Stewart, 2006). The hypothesis to be empirically tested is as follows: 
H2d. There is a positive relationship between audit committee directors' financial expertise and 
audit fees. 
 
2.3 Ownership Concentration.  
As part of assessing corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on audit fees, ownership 
concentration is considered an essential factor (Desender et al., 2013). Companies with weak 
governance mechanisms are characterised to have block holders (Lin and Liu, 2009). Ownership 
concentration offers controlling shareholders more power leading to better monitoring, more 
disciplined managers and reduced agency cost associated with lower audit fees (Bozec and Dia, 
2017). AlQadasi and Abidin (2018) state that there is a negative relationship between the demand 
for extensive audit services and ownership concentration. Having said that weak corporate 
governance is characterised by the existing of block-holders, companies with effective governance 
mechanisms demand more audit services leading to an increase in audit fees. Less quality auditors 
are accepted by block-holders (Quick et al., 2018).  
Block-holders are involved in monitoring activities over problems causing high agency 
cost. Accordingly, managers disclose more information in annual reports in order to minimise 
agency cost where ownership concentration exists (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007). Along with 
previous studies (Dao et al., 2008 and Lin and Liu, 2009) block/high ownership is defined by 
shareholders holding more than 5% of companies' shares.  Therefore, the hypothesis to be 
empirically tested would be as follows: 
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H3. There is a negative relationship between ownership concentration/block holders and audit 
fees. 
 
2.4 Control Variables 
 
The majority of non-financial corporations comprising the sample are assets-based 
companies, where assets are the main driver for future economic growth and profit. Therefore, the 
size of the companies is measured by total assets. Leverage is measured by long-term debt divided 
by total assets (Jorjani and Safari Gerayeli, 2018). Including a leverage variable to control 
companies' risk is crucial for evidencing an external auditor corporate governance role (Fan and 
Wong, 2005) and related additional audit fees. Director monitoring of creditors and lenders, by 
leverage, is not sufficient to prevent directors from over optimistic financial reporting, that require 
additional work and chargeable audit hours (Uang et al., 2006). For Broye and Weill (2008), highly 
leveraged companies demand higher audit quality and accordingly higher audit fees. Companies 
that are more profitable are more likely to pay premium fees for better audit quality (Abbott and 
Parker, 2000). Companies' profitability is measured by return on assets ratio. Lin and Liu (2009) 
consider that liquidity plays a significant role in switching to a lower auditor quality and 
accordingly lower audit fees. Liquidity is measured by the ratio of current assets over total assets.  
Industry membership is controlled in order to study the changes in audit fees when line of 
industry differs (Johnstone, 2000).  Industry sections are classified into six groups with a dummy 
measurement. Line of industry data is extracted from FTSE codes for listed companies.  
Based on the above literature, the relationship between the different independent variables (Board 
characteristics, audit committee and ownership concentration) and the dependent variable (audit 
fees) indicate a demand nature rather than a supply perspective.  
 
2.5 The Supply and Demand Side of Audit Pricing 
 
From a supply perspective, external auditors, when working on complex fair value measurements 
critical accounting estimates, charge higher audit fees (Ettredge, Xu, and Yi, 2014). Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2009) mention that companies with large losses incur high audit fees since auditors 
tolerate higher audit risk. Audit may charge and supply higher audit fees when there is an increased 
liability (Li et al., 2019). In addition, companies with low risk assessment incur lower audit fees. 
Auditors may reduce the nature, extent and timing of audit fees because of their assessment (Ghosh 
and Tang, 2015). 
From a demand perspective, more audit assurance is demanded from independent board 
members leading to an increase in audit fees (Bliss, 2011). Active audit committees are keen to 
achieve a better audit quality. More audit effort is required from external auditors leading to higher 
audit fees (Tsui et al., 2001).  
Knowing the sample of this research is made up of companies listed at the FTSE 350; these 
companies are subject to heavy regulations and precise applicable standards. Accordingly, 
directors demand better audit quality and financial reporting process (Willekens and Simunic, 
2007). Divers and large audit committees are characterized to demand more audit quality as well 
resulting in more audit fees (Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2016). The research objective and scope 
is to assess the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on audit pricing. Accordingly, the 
demand side is used to develop the research arguments and hypotheses. 
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3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
Companies are selected from the FTSE 350 database that represents 350 companies in the 
UK. FTSE 350 is an index based on market capitalisation weighted stock market incorporating the 
largest 350 companies by capitalisation, which have their primary listing on the London Stock 
Exchangeꞌꞌ (FTSE, 2010). Financial institutions and utilities are excluded due to their differing 
regulations and financial structures, which reduce the role of the Board of Directors in these types 
of companies (Chen et al., 2010).  The initial sample size is 1400 (350*4 years) companies for a 
four years period. The final tested sample size is 908 regressed observations.  
Four years' data is collected from 2012-2015 companiesꞌ annual reports, helping in 
understanding how audit fees vary during that period – one in which especially economists and 
different stakeholders were asking about the external auditor role after various accounting 
scandals. Analysing data collected over four years helps highlight whether companies are abiding 
by the UK Corporate Governance Code and its ꞌComply and Explainꞌ approach.  
3.2 Model Specification 
The econometric model of this empirical study is as follows: 
AF=β1+β2BSt+β3BIt+β4RDt+β5ACSt+β6ACIt+β7ACMt+β8FINEXPt+β9OCt+β10LnTAt+β11
ROAt+β12LQDt+β13LeVt+β14InDt+e 
 
Dependent variable 
 AF (Audit Fees) = natural log of external audit fees 
Board of Directors' variables 
 BS (Board of Directors size) = number of members serving on the  Board of Directors  
 BI (Independent Board members) = the percentage of directors on the board who are 
independent directors  
 RD (Role Duality) =  a dummy variable given the value of 1 if the CEO is also chairman 
of the board and 0 otherwise 
Audit committee variables 
 ACS (Audit committee size) = number of members serving on the audit committee 
 ACI Audit Committee Independence= the percentage of directors on the audit 
committee who are outside directors 
 ACM (Audit Committee Effectiveness) = frequency of audit committee meetings 
 FINEXP (Audit committee financial expert directors) = the percentage of members of the 
audit committee who are financial experts. Information about the financial expertise were 
extracted from the annual reports. 
 Ownership variable 
 OC (Ownership concentration/Block holders) = ratio of shareholders owning five per 
cent of equity against companies' equity 
Firms-specific control variables 
 LnTA (Companies' size) = total assets 
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 ROA (Profitability) = net income divided by total assets  
 LQD (Liquidity) = current assets divided by total assets  
 LEV (Leverage) = long-term liabilities divided by total assets 
 InD (Industry) = Type of industry from FTSE 350 schedules 
 
97.3% of the FTSE 350 companies are audited by Big Four auditors. Accordingly, auditor type 
variable is not included as part of measuring audit quality. In addition, going concern variable is 
not included as a potential proxy to measure audit quality since the majority of tested companies 
do not have any going-concern issues. 
Companies are classified based on the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) and Dow 
Jones Industrial (DJI) Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) as follows: 
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TABLE 1- Companies' Classification 
Source: FTSE Client Service 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The median of audit fees is 700,000 British Pounds. Among governance variables, the median of 
role duality (RD) indicates that most companies do not have major role duality issues. The average 
size of the Board of Directors (BS) is nine members. The mean value of BI is 0.584 indicating that 
just over half of the companies had BI serving on the board. 
The median of audit committee members is three. Thus, the majority of companies tested comply 
with the governance code related to audit committee establishment guidelines (minimum three 
members). It is noted also that some companies have two audit committee members, which is 
allowed for smaller companies. For audit committee independence (ACI), a median result of one 
indicates that the majority of companies tested have independent audit committee membership. 
Audit committee meetings vary significantly. Some are held once per year while others are held 
15 times per year. The financial literacy of audit committee directors (FINEXP) results indicate 
that some companies do not have any audit committee members with financial expertise, while 
others have audit committees with all members possessing financial expertise. The ownership 
concentration (OC) median is 26 per cent.  
  
FTSE / DJI INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION BENCHMARK (ICB)  
0001  Oil & Gas 77 
1000  Basic Materials 88 
2000  Industrials 285 
3000  Consumer Goods 103 
4000  Health Care 31 
5000  Consumer Services 253 
6000  Telecommunications 21 
9000  Technology 50 
2012  227 
2013  229 
2014  229 
2015  223 
N=  908 
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TABLE 2 - Descriptive Statistics (n=908) 
The Spearman correlation matrix is used to test the multicollinearity assumptions. There are no 
significant multicollinearity problems among variables as correlation values are relatively low. 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is used as well and there was no evidence of major 
multicollinearity problems.  
 
 Minimum 
(Maximum) 
Mean 
(Median) 
Standard 
Skewness 
Standard 
Kurtosis 
Standard 
Deviation 
Audit Fees 28,000 
(39,649,416) 
1,854,190 
(700,000) 
5.792 
 
43.967 
 
3,918,626 
 
Role Duality 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.042 
(0.000) 
4.576 21.938 0.200 
Board Size 5.000 
(22.000) 
9.340 
(9.000) 
1.110 4.881 2.485 
Board Independence 0.000 
1.000 
0.584 
(0.570) 
0.024 3.405 0.126 
Audit Committee Size 2.000 
(8.000) 
3.629 
(3.000) 
1.236 5.339 0.862 
Audit Committee Independence 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.855 
(1.000) 
-1.906 5.156 0.300 
Audit Committee Meetings 1.000 
(15.000) 
4.031 
(4.000) 
2.362 13.697 1.462 
Financial Experts 0.000 
1.000 
0.348 
(0.330) 
1.416 5.990 0.181 
Ownership Concentration 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.294 
(0.260) 
0.760 3.263 0.194 
Total Assets (£ꞌ000) 34,130 
(206,042,797) 
6,362,582 
(1,408,132) 
6.733 
 
54.936 
 
19,600,000 
 
Return on Assets -1.270 
(1.140) 
0.070 
(0.060) 
-0.361 39.042 0.118 
Liquidity 0.030 
(0.980) 
0.395 
(0.370) 
0.620 2.954 0.207 
Leverage 0.000 
(1.180) 
0.298 
(0.270) 
0.706 3.530 0.193 
Oil & Gas 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.085 
(0.000) 
2.981 9.885 0.279 
Basic Materials 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.097 
(0.000) 
2.725 8.425 0.296 
Consumer Goods 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.113 
(0.000) 
2.438 6.943 0.317 
Industrials 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.313 
(0.000) 
0.808 1.652 0.464 
Consumer Services 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.279 
(0.000) 
0.988 1.975 0.449 
Telecomm. 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.023 
(0.000) 
6.345 41.262 0.150 
Health Care 0.000 
(1.000) 
0.034 
(0.000) 
5.131 27.326 0.182 
Technology 
 
0.000 
(1.000) 
0.055 
(0.000) 
3.899 16.198 0.228 
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4.2 Multivariate Statistics 
Time series panel regression is used (Table 3). The Random - Effects GLS regression is 
used with a robust standard error to fit with non-parametric data.  
Consistent with the expectation, there is a negative significant relationship between audit fees and 
role duality (β= -.361, p .01). It is concluded that when a chief executive officer is not holding a 
position of chairperson of the Board of Directorsꞌ tasks and responsibilities, audit fees would 
increase. Role duality gives excessive power to the individual holding the two positions, which 
may lead to lower audit fees. This conclusion aligns with the results of Niskanen et al. (2011) 
where the demand for better audit quality and the willingness to pay higher audit fees declines in 
the presence of role duality. A CEO with dual roles might have a tendency to limit outside 
supervision knowing the audit report will be used to assess management stewardship (Desender, 
2011). Less supervision is associated with less demand for audit services leading to a decrease in 
audit fees. On the other hand, with role duality the decision-making process is facilitated; 
supporting good stewardship.  
The Board of Directors' size shows a positive significant relationship with audit fees (β= 
.079, p .01). This result supports the expected relationship between board size and audit fees (H1b). 
Having large board of directors indicate diverse members who are keen about their reputation 
resulting in more demand for audit quality and financial reporting process (Willekens and Simunic, 
2007). The results are consistent with the findings of Karim et al. (2016) who state that large Board 
of Directors demand more monitoring from auditors which is associated with more chargeable 
hours and audit fees. The results support the conclusion by Carecello et al. (2002) who argue that 
larger boards with diligent members require more audit quality from external auditors compared 
with companies with less diligent board members. In addition to the theoretical argument that 
agency problems are resolved by assigning high quality auditor.  
Consistent with expectation, there is a positive significant relationship between board 
independence and audit fees (β= .917, p .01). This result indicates that independent board members 
require and demand better audit quality compared to executive board members. Independent board 
members are known to have impact on audit fees (Zaman et al., 2011) because they strengthen the 
reporting system through assigning quality auditors (Jizi and Nehme, 2018). In theory, more 
agency cost through heavy monitoring from directors leads to a variance of audit quality 
(Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). The results align with the argument that agency cost is minimised 
by the existence of more independent members that will help in reducing the gap with external 
auditors (Uang et al., 2006) and consequently better audit quality. Our results align with the results 
of Chen and Zhou (2007) who conclude that independent directors demand better auditor 
reputation and audit quality. In addition, the results are consistent with the results of Carcello et 
al. (2002) who state that the greater preponderance of independent members will lead to more 
concern about audit quality.  
As for audit committee characteristics, only frequency of meetings (β= .112, p .01) and the level 
of financial experts' existence within an audit committee (β= -.209, p .05) show a significant impact 
on audit fees. The size and independence of audit committee variable show to have no significant 
impact on audit fees.  
 Consistent with the expectation (H2c), there is a positive significant relationship between 
audit committee frequency of meetings and audit fees (β= .112, p .01). Effective audit committees 
lead to an increase of audit fees. It is due to the nature of audit committees' tasks that are closely 
inter-related with external auditors' work. Chen and Zhou (2007) indicate that more active audit 
committees assign Big Four external auditors, perceived as better quality auditors. More frequent 
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audit committee meetings help to reduce potential financial reporting problems (Farber, 2005). 
This result aligns with the theoretical agency framework where audit committee meet more to 
mitigate potential agency problems (Sharma et al., 2009) and to maintain good quality audit. 
Contrary to the expectation (H2d), there is a negative significant relationship between audit 
fees and audit committee members with financial expertise. This result indicates that external 
auditors incur additional time and charge additional audit fees to cover the absence gap of financial 
experts in an audit committee. One of the main objectives for establishing audit committees is to 
enhance the monitoring tool of shareholders over management from an agency theory perspective. 
The absence of financial experts from audit committees, the role of external auditors is considered 
important vis-à-vis the classic shareholder-management problem (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011).  
Consistent with the expectation (H3), there is a negative significant relationship between 
ownership concentration and audit fees (β= -.270, p .05). Since block holders have a controlling 
power and more access to companies' information, they do not demand excessive work from 
external auditors as all data needed is obtained from the company itself. Subsequently, when block 
holders/ownership concentration exists, higher audit fees may not be a demanding issue. The 
results align with Lin and Liu's study (2009) where there is a direct relationship between ownership 
concentration and a change to a lower audit quality auditor. In addition, ownership concentration 
offers controlling shareholders more power leading and reduced agency cost associated with lower 
audit fees (Bozec and Dia, 2017). 
 As for control variables, companiesꞌ size (LnTA) results in a positive significant 
relationship with audit fees. It can be concluded that larger companies demand better audit quality 
and get charged higher audit fees as larger companies consist of a larger number of shareholders 
or share capital. Better audit quality is demanded for better reputation among stakeholders, helping 
large companies to obtain and maintain a good line of credit with financial institutions (Haskins 
and Williams, 1990). Profitability (ROA), liquidity (LQD), and leverage (LEV) show no 
significant statistical relationship with audit fees contrary to Chen et al. (2010) who indicate that 
leverage shows to have a negative significant relationship with firm performance.  
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TABLE 3 - Panel Regression Using Robust Standard Error 
(Random - Effects GLS regression) 
*p < .10, 
**p < 
.05, ***p 
< .01 
4.2.1
 Additional testing  
Table four presents the statistical relationship among variables using the 2SLS regression test. 
Using the Durbin-Wu Hausman test, the industry and control variables are lagged. Accordingly, 
an average of one year is excluded. The 'Lag model' is a regression used to predict the current 
Ln Audit Fees Coefficient z-statistics 
   
Intercept 
 
4.846 14.680*** 
Role Duality 
 
-0.361 -3.230*** 
Board Size 
 
0.079 9.130*** 
Board Independence 
 
0.917 12.480*** 
Audit Committee Size 
 
0.016 0.940 
Audit Committee Independence 
 
-0.190 -1.490 
Audit Committee Meetings 
 
0.112 5.260*** 
Financial Expert 
 
-0.209 -2.800** 
Ownership Concentration 
 
-0.270 -2.450** 
Ln Total Assets 
 
0.515 33.230*** 
Return on Assets 
 
-0.006 -0.020 
Liquidity 
 
-0.093 -0.820 
Leverage 
 
-0.370 -1.340 
Oil & Gas 
 
-0.403 -3.340*** 
Basic Materials 
 
-0.128 -1.250 
Consumer Goods 
 
-0.194 -2.140** 
Industrials 
 
0.432 4.830*** 
Consumer Services 
 
-0.204 -1.990** 
Telecomm. 
 
-0.095 -0.400 
Health Care 
 
0.097 0.470 
Technology 
 
(omitted)  
Years  Yes 
R-squared 
 
0.601 
Number of groups 4 
N 908 
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value of the dependent variable based on the current and past values of explanatory variables. The 
lagged technique retains the validity of ordinary Least-square regression. Except for RD and ACI, 
all independent variables show the same results to those stated for the results reached. It is better 
to rely on OLS tests when variables are exogenous (Söderbom, 2009). 
TABLE 4 - 2SLS Regression Test 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 
Ln Audit Fees Coefficient z-statistics 
   
Intercept 
 
5.682 9.500*** 
Role Duality 
 
-0.337 -1.570 
Board Size 
 
0.137 5.860*** 
Board Independence 
 
1.867 4.020*** 
Audit Committee Size 
 
-0.055 -1.030 
Audit Committee Independence 
 
-0.339 -2.330** 
Audit Committee Meetings 
 
0.097 3.630*** 
Financial Expert 
 
-0.565 -2.060** 
Ownership Concentration 
 
-0.594 -2.240** 
Ln Total Assets 
 
0.432 10.110*** 
Return on Assets 
 
-0.523 -0.520 
Liquidity 
 
-0.335 -1.450 
Leverage 
 
-0.512 -1.990** 
Oil & Gas 
 
-0.265 -1.370 
Basic Material 
 
-0.031 -0.170 
Consumer Goods 
 
0.010 0.050 
Industrial 
 
0.579 3.560*** 
Consumer Services 
 
-0.164 -0.980 
Telecomm. 
 
0.158 0.560 
Health Care 
 
0.225 0.950 
Technology 
 
(omitted)  
Years  Yes 
R-squared 
 
0.588 
N 
 
619 
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The 'Lag model' is a regression used to predict the current value of the dependent variable based 
on the current and past values of explanatory variables. The lagged technique retains the validity 
of ordinary Least-square regression. Except for RD and ACI, all independent variables show the 
same results to those stated for the results reached. It is better to rely on OLS tests when variables 
are exogenous (Söderbom, 2009). 
 
5 CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION AND RESEACH LIMITATION 
Previous studies have been conducted to assess audit fees in relation to different 
governance mechanisms. OꞌSullivan (2000) states that role duality and block holders have no 
impact on audit fees. The latter lacks the inclusion of audit committee variables, which differentiate 
our study from previous ones.  On the other hand, Zaman et al., (2011) lacks the inclusion of 
ownership concentration and board of directors' variables as independent variables. Our results 
indicate that audit fees have a significant positive relationship with board size and independence 
and a negative relationship with role duality. It can be concluded that within the British context, 
an independent and bigger board of directors with diverse backgrounds leads to higher audit fees. 
It is said that independent directors demand a better audit reputation (Chen and Zhou, 2007). The 
results show that role duality tend to lower audit fees. When two positions are being managed by 
one individual, the decision making process is facilitated leading to less excessive demands in 
relation to audit matters. 
As for audit committee variables and their impact on audit fees, the results show a positive 
significant relationship between audit committee meetings and audit fees. It is supported that audit 
committees exercise more efforts for better surveillance (Ariningrum and Diyanty, 2017). The 
preponderance of financial experts within an audit committee is negatively related to audit fees. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, this result indicates that auditors incur additional time when the audit 
committee lacks financial experts.  
The paper focuses on the demand side of audit pricing and how agency cost plays a critical 
role in establishing an effective or a weak corporate governance. It can be concluded that the less 
agency cost, the less is the demand for better audit services that is associated with more audit fees. 
Controlling shareholders do not face any major information asymmetry for them to demand more 
audit services.   
 The results of this study give signalling indicators to audit firms and companies in terms 
of audit fees. The positive impact of board of directors’ size and independence indicate the need 
for larger boards with diverse backgrounds if companies are seeking for better audit quality. If 
companies are seeking to lower audit fees, it is recommended to have their chairperson and CEO 
positions to be held by one person since our results show that role duality leads to lower audit fees. 
In terms of audit committee, if companies are looking for better financial reporting process and 
high audit quality, audit committees should be active and vigilant by holding frequent meetings 
other than the regular quarterly meetings. In periods where companies are seeking cost reduction, 
companies with concentrated ownership are those who will benefit from lower audit fees. 
Compensation for financial experts would also lead to lower audit fees in period where companies 
have a tendency to lower their expenses. The expertise of the audit committee member(s) is 
expected to subsidise highly paid auditors.  
It is noted that most of the previous literature focused on audit fees without differentiating 
between audit fees arising from mandatory or voluntary assignments delivered by audit firms. We 
selected mandatory audit fees, and not total auditors' remuneration that may include, audit fees, 
advisory fees, consultancy fees etc. Auditors engaged to deliver mandatory audit assignments are 
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legally more liable compared to auditors performing other advisory on-demand assignments. Non-
audit fee is excluded to avoid questioning auditors' independence (Wines, 1994).  
 Another way to explore audit fees in relation to governance mechanisms and companies' 
characteristics might be through conducting a survey (questionnaire or interviews) with 
companies' personnel. This may help in understanding the perception of management and staff 
about the impact of governance mechanisms on audit fees. It should give additional evidence on 
factors affecting audit fees in addition to the factors and results concluded from the use of an 
econometric model and regression tests.  
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